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Americans are much more likely to be socially connected to
copartisans, both in daily life and on social media. However, this
observation does not necessarily mean that shared partisanship
per se drives social tie formation, because partisanship is con-
founded with many other factors. Here, we test the causal effect
of shared partisanship on the formation of social ties in a field
experiment on Twitter. We created bot accounts that self-
identified as people who favored the Democratic or Republican
party and that varied in the strength of that identification. We
then randomly assigned 842 Twitter users to be followed by one
of our accounts. Users were roughly three times more likely to
reciprocally follow-back bots whose partisanship matched their
own, and this was true regardless of the bot’s strength of identi-
fication. Interestingly, there was no partisan asymmetry in this
preferential follow-back behavior: Democrats and Republicans
alike were much more likely to reciprocate follows from coparti-
sans. These results demonstrate a strong causal effect of shared
partisanship on the formation of social ties in an ecologically valid
field setting and have important implications for political psychol-
ogy, social media, and the politically polarized state of the
American public.
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Partisanship is a core element of social identity for manypeople (1). For example, Americans tend to distrust and
dislike those from the opposing political party and often report
that they are unwilling to be friends with members of the op-
posing party (2). In line with this self-reported dislike for coun-
terpartisans, observational studies find that Americans are
substantially more likely to have face-to-face social interactions
with copartisans (3) and to be connected to copartisans on social
media networks (4)—all of which may contribute to “echo
chambers” where like-minded individuals preferentially ex-
change information with, and influence, those who share similar
worldviews (5–7).
However, are people actually more likely to form social ties
purely based on shared partisanship? Observational studies
documenting assortment based on partisanship (sometimes de-
scribed as homophily) do not offer credible evidence of a causal
effect of shared partisanship on tie formation. Copartisanship is
correlated with a multitude of other factors that are also likely to
influence social tie formation. For example, individuals may
simply be forming social ties based on other factors that happen
to be correlated with partisanship, such as age, race, geographic
location, or other interests and preferences (8). Furthermore, it
may be that people have more opportunities to form ties with
copartisans, rather than an actual preference for forming
copartisan ties (9). In the context of social media in particular,
recommendation algorithms may be preferentially suggesting
like-minded users as new potential contacts.
Thus, experimental evidence on social tie formation is needed.
Because one cannot easily randomly introduce individuals to one
another and examine who decides to befriend whom, nearly all
research investigating causal effects of shared partisanship on
interpersonal dynamics has relied on hypothetical self-report
measures in survey experiments (e.g., ref. 2); a notable excep-
tion involves experimentally using a dating website to document
copartisan preference in romantic relationships (10). As a result,
despite all of the interest in this area, the extent to which people
condition on partisanship when actually forming social ties “in
the wild” remains a largely open question.
Here, we shed light on this issue. We do so by leveraging the
power of field experiments on social media to allow for the
causal identification of copartisanship’s influence on actual so-
cial tie formation. Specifically, we created Twitter accounts that
varied in their partisanship and examined how likely Twitter
users were to reciprocate social tie formation when followed by
copartisan versus counterpartisan accounts. Our bot accounts
were designed to appear as humans with identical descriptions,
except 1) which political party they identified with and 2) the
strength of that identification; see Fig. 1.
Results
Fig. 2 shows the fraction of Democratic and Republican users
that reciprocated our bot accounts’ social tie formation in each
experimental condition. We analyze the results using a linear
probability model predicting whether the user followed the bot
based on copartisanship with the bot, partisanship extremity of
the bot, political partisanship of the user, and all interactions; we
also report exact P values (PFRI) calculated via Fisherian ran-
domization inference based on 10,000 permutations. We found
evidence for strong preferential social tie formation based on
shared partisanship (b = 0.093 [0.051, 0.135], t(840) = 4.381, P <
0.001, PFRI < 0.001): Users were nearly three times more likely to
follow-back a copartisan compared to a counterpartisan. We
found no significant interaction between copartisanship and
partisanship strength of the bot (P = 0.465, PFRI = 0.469) and no
significant main effect of bot extremity (P = 0.754, PFRI = 0.748).
However, an exploratory post hoc analysis found some evidence
of a positive three-way interaction between copartisanship, bot
partisanship strength, and user partisanship strength (P = 0.051,
PFRI = 0.037), whereby more partisan users were particularly
likely to follow-back strong copartisan bots.
In addition to documenting an overall preference for tie for-
mation with copartisans, our design allows us to investigate
partisan asymmetries in this effect. Some observational research
has argued that conservatives tend to be more homophilous on
Twitter (11). Yet, in our experiment there was no significant
difference in the extent of preferential follow-back of copartisans
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among Democrats versus Republicans (interaction between
copartisan bot and user partisanship, b = 0.012 [−0.071, 0.096],
P = 0.771, and PFRI = 0.784). We also found no significant main
effect of user partisanship, P = 0.563 and PFRI = 0.583, and no
significant three-way interaction with bot extremity, P = 0.886
and PFRI = 0.881.
Discussion
Here we provide evidence that shared partisanship per se has a
causal—and large—effect on preferential social tie formation on
Twitter. This observation has important implications.
First, our results suggest that prior findings about preferential
attachment from survey experiments in political psychology do
generalize to actual social tie formation. This is of substantial
theoretical significance, given the large body of existing survey
work coupled with lack of field experiments outside the context
of romantic relationships (10). Furthermore, our results contribute
to ongoing debates about asymmetries in partisan bias (12, 13). In
contrast to the suggestions of some observational work (11), we find
that Democrats and Republicans in our sample are equally likely to
favor copartisan strangers when forming new social ties. Of course,
here we studied (at least somewhat) politically active Twitter users,
who are not representative of either Twitter users or the country as
a whole. Future work should investigate how our findings generalize
to more representative samples. Relatedly, our bots signaled their
partisanship largely via which presidential candidate they supported.
However, members of a given party may not support the party’s
nominee, and thus the bots’ candidate identification may have put
off some copartisans. If so, our experiment would have under-
estimated the true impact of shared partisanship on tie formation,
potentially to different extents for Democrats versus Republicans.
Future work should investigate this issue.
Second, we shed light on the microfoundations of the partisan
assortment—and associated potential for “echo chambers”—
Fig. 1. Design of bot accounts. We created eight human-like, identical-looking bot accounts (two per each condition) and varied their political partisanship
(Republican versus Democrat) as well as the extremity of political partisanship (stronger versus weaker). The bot accounts followed a set of elite accounts
matching their political partisanship and retweeted randomly from these accounts every day (this was the same for bot accounts with stronger or weaker
political partisanship). Bot accounts with stronger partisanship have a background supporting the Democrat versus Republican candidate and include the
name of the candidate as part of their profile names.
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Fig. 2. Twitter users of both parties were nearly three times more likely to follow-back a copartisan account compared to a counterpartisan account. Shown is the
probability of Democratic and Republican users following-back our accounts in each experimental condition. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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that is observed on social media networks. Our findings dem-
onstrate that people are more likely to be connected to copar-
tisans not just because of preexisting partisan assortment in
offline networks or because algorithms preferentially recom-
mend new connections with copartisans. Instead, partisans are
much more likely to connect to complete strangers simply be-
cause they share the same political views. This suggests that if
one seeks to reduce partisan assortment on social media net-
works it may be necessary for algorithms to actively counteract
preexisting psychological biases—biases that are part of the po-
litical sectarianism in which America is currently embroiled (14).
Methods
We identified Twitter users who had retweeted MSNBC or Fox News posts,
collected up to their last 3,200 tweets, and classified each user’s partisanship
based on the content they shared from left- versus right-leaning websites
(15) (strength of partisanship was measured as the absolute value of parti-
sanship score). We removed users with more than 15,000 followers or for
whom the partisanship estimator was unable to return a score and then
constructed a politically balanced set of users to form the subject pool for
our experiment. We created homogeneous blocks of users based on parti-
sanship, users’ partisanship extremity (absolute value of estimated parti-
sanship), number of followers, number of days with at least one tweet in
past 14 d, and number of mutual friendships divided by total number of
followers (as a proxy for tendency to reciprocate follows). We then used this
blocking to randomly assign the partisanship concordance and identification
strength of the bot that followed each user. To make our bot accounts
credible, each account initially had ∼1,000 politically neutral followers and
retweeted 10 political tweets aligned with the bot’s ideology. We had
planned to follow 6,000 users over 14 d, but Twitter blocked our accounts’
ability to follow more users after 2 d, at which point we were forced to
conclude the experiment after following n = 842 users (median 64.5 fol-
lowers, 218 followed accounts, 4,416 total tweets, 46% Republican, 45%
female, and mean age 45.8 y). Our study was approved with a waiver of
informed consent by the MIT Committee on the Use of Humans as Experi-
mental Subjects Protocol 910465 and preregistered at https://aspredicted.
org/ca3nm.pdf.
Data Availability. All data and scripts necessary to reproduce the results are
available in Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/s5e6j/.
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